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Taking Advantage of Institutional Weakness? Political Stability and Foreign Subsidiary 
Survival in Primary Industries
Abstract
Purpose: We investigate the extent to which locating primary industry subsidiaries in politically 
unstable countries impacts their survival. We argue that foreign multinational enterprises in less 
stable political environments can shape policies that are impactful on the costs of operating in 
primary industries and avoid compliance with more stringent policies at home. 
Methodology: Using a sample of 753 primary sector investments of Japanese multinational 
enterprises during the period 1986 to 2013, we conduct a parametric survival analysis of the 
relationship between political stability and subsidiary survival. 
Findings: Political instability has a slight, curvilinear relationship with subsidiary survival, such 
that both high and low stability are associated with lower exit hazard, while moderate levels of 
stability increased exit hazard. This nonlinear relationship is stronger for efficiency-seeking 
subsidiaries, and weaker for market-seeking subsidiaries.  
Originality: This research contributes to the debate around the pros and cons of globalization by 
examining the extent to which firms benefit by offshoring primary sector investments to avoid 
more costly legal requirements at home. The results suggest that this non-market strategy should 
be mitigated through appropriate policy measures and provides evidence that those policies already 
implemented are effective. 
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), anti-globalization, legal compliance, natural 
resources, primary industries, subsidiary exit hazard

































































Economic globalization, the process by which economic activity increases and becomes 
more integrated across national borders, has accelerated in recent decades, as foreign direct 
investment (FDI) expands the global reach of production, international trade, consumption, 
knowledge, and technology (Guillén, 2001). While there are many positive outcomes associated 
with globalization, such as increasing pressures on governments to adopt pro-market reforms, 
improve living standards, and support basic human rights, which together have contributed to a 
substantial reduction in the rate of global poverty, globalization clearly has its detractors 
(Bhagwati, 2002, 2004; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2019; Meyer, 2017). 
While not exclusive to market-oriented economies, anti-globalization sentiment has its 
highest impact there, with opposition voiced towards the offshoring of production and service jobs, 
accelerating environmental degradation, and promoting low-standard working conditions. 
Likewise, increased returns to capital and reduced expenditure on social benefits within the 
communities in which multinational enterprises (MNEs) operate, uneven distribution of the 
benefits of globalization, and the elimination of the middle class, are all seen as the drivers of 
rising economic inequality in the developed countries (Alvaredo et al., 2013; Piketty, 2014). In 
this paper, we seek to understand the extent to which locating MNEs in politically unstable 
countries impacts their performance, in order to provide empirical evidence about the non-market 
activities of MNEs, as shapers, and avoiders, of legal requirements.
Whereas most studies concerning FDI and political stability are concerned with the impact 
of host country characteristics on the location and entry mode of MNEs’ FDI, our study examines 
the role of political stability, amongst other location characteristics, on the survival of primary 
sector (i.e. natural resources) subsidiaries. We conduct our research in the primary industries 
































































because this sector tends to be capital intensive, leading to higher sunk costs of investment in 
relatively immobile assets, and hence high sensitivity to incremental cost implications of legal 
requirements. Hence both location and relocation decisions require substantial due diligence. 
Furthermore, these industries conduct activities which are subject to a host of regulations aimed at 
environmental protection, worker safety, and employment standards. We choose subsidiary 
survival (inversely operationalized as exit hazard) as our performance indicator, as profitability 
and market measures of performance tend to be more appropriate when evaluating the overall 
performance of MNEs, rather than individual subsidiaries (Ariño, 2003).
We argue that MNEs face a tradeoff between higher transaction- and compliance-costs, 
depending on the degree of political stability in potential host countries. As a result, we argue that 
subsidiaries experience the highest survival rates (i.e. lowest exit hazard) when they are established 
in either the most (lowest transaction costs) or least (lowest compliance costs) politically stable 
countries. Consequently, as political stability increases, hazard rates first increase and later 
diminish, resulting in an inverted U-shaped relationship between political stability and exit hazard. 
To further test the posited tradeoff between transaction and compliance costs, we also examine 
how the relationship varies depending on investment motives. Prior research in the field has 
employed several theoretical perspectives such as transaction cost economics, population ecology, 
institutional theories, etc. to explain the determinants of MNE subsidiaries’ survival (Demirbag et 
al., 2011). Yet, the role of compliance costs in ‘escape’ FDI has not been fully assessed (Barnard 
and Luiz, 2018; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). 
Combining the logic of FDI and institutional economic theories (Cantwell et al., 2010; 
Dunning and Lundan, 2008), we argue that political instability can allow firms greater leeway in 
influencing domestic policy and providing protection from unfavorable policy decisions. When 
































































political stability is high, firms enter a host country with a better understanding of the ‘rules of the 
game’ (North, 1987). Highly stable environments reduce the risk of obsolescing bargains and other 
expropriation risks (Henisz, 2000; Kobrin, 1979), while protecting firms’ assets and intellectual 
property rights that underpin their firm-specific advantages (Weingast, 1993). Hence political 
stability is expected to reduce transaction costs, thereby improving the performance, and ultimately 
survival, of foreign subsidiaries.
However, we argue that while MNEs may face lower transaction costs, they may 
experience higher compliance costs when located in countries with high political stability (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2016; Witt and Lewin, 2007), especially in the primary sector, in which a diverse set of 
stakeholders promote competing priorities (Kobrin, 1979). In the case of labor market regulations 
and workplace safety, for example, increased costs tend to reduce location attractiveness (Cheng, 
2006; Cooke, 1997). Similarly, more stringent financial reporting requirements, environmental 
protection regulations, and working conditions can reduce the ability of a subsidiary to adapt to 
changing global demand and regulations, thereby inducing closure or relocation of operations 
(Barnard and Luiz, 2018). Hence, firms face a trade-off between transaction and compliance costs 
when considering the political instability of a location. 
We employ mixed-effects parametric survival analysis to test our predictions on a near-
population level sample of Japanese overseas direct investments in primary industries operating 
during the period 19862013. We find evidence to support the predicted inverted U-shaped 
relationship between political stability and subsidiary exit hazard, although the relationship was 
predominantly positive, with a much smaller diminishing effect at high levels of instability. The 
strength of this relationship was impacted by efficiency- and market-seeking motives but not by 
natural resource-seeking and asset-seeking motives. 
































































This research contributes to the debate on the merits of globalization (Lewin and Peeters, 
2006; Meyer, 2017), specifically through examining the extent to which MNEs may use weak 
regulatory regimes to exploit workers and avoid environmental protection and financial reporting 
transparency. While we find some support that subsidiaries face reduced exit hazard at opposite 
extremes of political stability, rather than in more moderate stable political environments, the 
extent to which this is occurring should not be exaggerated. Specifically, the use of institutional 
arbitrage by Japanese MNEs to seek an advantage over domestic firms, while undermining efforts 
to improve environmental and social performance, appears rare. Our findings support the call to 
extend FDI theory through examining the impact of internalizing non-market failures (Buckley, 
2018), such as political instability, and contributes to outlining the boundary conditions on FDI 
theory by taking into consideration the sometimes neglected characteristics of the primary 
industries, especially the substantial impact of non-market transactions on performance.
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
2.1. Political stability and subsidiary survival in the primary sector
Early arguments in favor of international trade and economic globalization are rooted in 
the Heckscher-Ohlin factor endowment theory, in which differences in land, labor, capital, and 
technology guide specialization within, and trade between, countries (Schott, 2003). Institutional 
economists and business scholars later added the role of MNEs as transaction cost minimizers, 
overcoming deficiencies in the institutional systems that support an efficient market, with a strong 
emphasis on the negotiation and enforcement of incomplete contracts (Dunning, 1977; Hennart 
and Park, 1994). Political stability, which reflects the reliability of the institutions governing 
































































contracts and property rights (Jensen, 2006; Slangen and Van Tulder, 2009), is widely studied as 
FDI location characteristic that impacts both ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs. Heightened 
political risk creates an unpredictable business environment characterized by large and abrupt 
changes in taxation, contract law, policies on expropriation, and other legal mechanisms, which in 
turn leads to higher contracting costs (i.e. negotiation, monitoring, and enforcement costs) 
(Crowley and Loviscek, 2002; Darendeli et al., 2020). International business scholars have relied 
on transaction cost arguments for location choice and entry mode studies, generally finding that 
lower transaction costs are favored and that higher ownership by the MNE is the preferred method 
for reducing transaction costs (Delios and Beamish, 2001; Demirbag et al., 2011). 
Although politically stable environments allow for more efficient transactions, research 
has not always found a positive relationship between political stability and location choice or 
performance of international investments (Barassi and Zhou, 2012; Helmy, 2013). When 
government policy is more volatile, negotiation can be a more effective tool for foreign firms to 
shape policy, and building informal networks with government actors will help MNEs to create 
competitive advantages (White et al., 2014). Enhanced negotiation and lobbying skills, which 
accrue to firms as a consequence of working in a politically unstable environment, can be a source 
of advantage for firms (García-Canal and Guillén, 2008; Yasuda and Mitsuhashi, 2017). Lobbying 
capabilities can enhance firms´ influence over the government and adapt to environmental changes 
(Lawton and Rajwani, 2011; Lawton et al., 2013). In extreme cases, politically unstable 
environments may even allow firms to violate environmental protection laws without being held 
accountable. These benefits, however, are offset by the foreseeable catastrophic events arising 
from lax oversight, for example, the armed attacks and a mine collapse which have killed many 
Freeport McMoRan’s employees in its Grasberg mine operations in Indonesia. 
































































Anti-globalization arguments rarely focus on transaction cost minimization. Instead they 
criticize cost reduction through offshoring and/or outsourcing jobs, evading regulatory 
requirements related to minimum wages, working conditions and employee benefits, 
environmental protection and stewardship, taxation, and financial reporting. These actions are 
perceived to undermine the functioning of civil society and the sovereignty of the state (Bhagwati, 
2004). We refer to these as institutional arbitrage arguments against globalization. 
Institutional arbitrage is a non-market strategy by which firms locate specific functions in 
countries that have the most favorable legal environment for that function, in terms of production 
and/or transaction costs (Jackson and Deeg, 2008; Witt and Lewin, 2007). Typically, firms that 
engage in institutional arbitrage tend to offshore activities when the institutional environment of 
their home country is weak (Rosenbusch et al., 2019). However, this strategy can also be used to 
escape home countries with strong institutions that are strong, in terms of compliance costs and 
enforcement, such as in the case of more stringent pollution control (Li and Zhou, 2017). Anti-
globalization arguments related to institutional arbitrage generally revolve around the idea that 
differences in policies, policy enforcement, and human rights allow MNEs to pit countries against 
one another to attract FDI, in a competition to provide the lowest possible standards (Davies and 
Vadlamannati, 2013), which result in the lowest compliance costs related to environmental 
protection, improved working condition, financial reporting standards, etc. Firms may invest in 
pollution havens, i.e., countries where environmental regulations are less restrictive (Dasgupta et 
al., 1999), especially those in “dirty” industries (Copeland and Taylor, 1994). Previous studies 
show that a reduction in regulatory stringency leads to increasing FDI inflows (Tang, 2015; 
Wagner and Timmins, 2009). In the case of primary industries, work is typically either technology 
or labor-intensive, and so MNEs can benefit  by locating in countries with lower labor standards 
































































to avoid costly technological upgrading (Weng and Peng, 2018). Finally, the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) refer to a set of rules that financial statements around the 
world follow to increase transparency and comparability across countries (Akpomi and Nnadi, 
2017; Nnadi and Soobaroyen, 2015). The impact of IFRS on attracting FDI in previous studies 
shows a mixed effect. Some argue that more transparency leads to increasing FDI (Gordon et al., 
2012; Márquez-Ramos, 2011), whereas Nnadi and Soobaroyen (2015) argue that it leads to lower 
FDI as a result of the increasing the cost of financial reporting.
Examples of compliance costs in the primary sector include the incrementally higher cost 
of using environmentally friendly construction techniques for facilities, extraction and production 
processes, maintaining improved working conditions, and paying higher wages (Surroca et al., 
2013). Hence, MNEs are generally faced with tradeoffs between at least two types of incremental 
costs when choosing between domestic and foreign locations for investment; namely transaction 
costs and compliance costs. Countries with high political stability tend to be more democratic, and 
possess more stable, liberalized economies, achieved through the creation of effective institutions 
to protect contracts and property rights, thereby reducing transaction costs (Holburn and Zelner, 
2010). However, partly as a result of being more democratic, the law serves a greater variety of 
stakeholder interests, which results in higher compliance costs (Barnard and Luiz, 2018). 
In summary, a highly stable political environment provides contractual provisions that are 
reliable, thus shielding foreign firms’ investments in the primary sector from increased transaction 
costs and improving their survival. However, the opportunity for negotiating policies and reducing 
compliance costs creates more flexibility for firms to shape the policy environment based on their 
interests which, in the extreme, can involve bribery and corruption (Jiménez and Alon, 2018; Park, 
2003; Yim et al., 2017). In situations where corruption is prevalent, regulation and agreements can 
































































have different impacts as a result of varying interpretations and the arbitrary enforcement of laws. 
Proactively engaging with a politically unstable system helps the MNE to bargain with government 
and political institutions to shape policies in their favor while benefitting from lower compliance 
costs (Bertrand et al., 2019; Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Yi et al., 2019). Firms 
that are more adept at lobbying and negotiation with government and legal actors can take 
advantage of lower compliance costs in politically unstable countries, while being less affected by 
increased bargaining costs, as compared to less-experienced competitors, in executing non-market 
strategies (Darendeli and Hill, 2016; Pinkse and Kolk, 2012). As a result, we predict that both low 
and high levels of political stability result in a highest primary-sector firm survival rate.
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between political stability and subsidiary exit 
hazard in the primary sector is inverted U-shaped: The lowest and highest levels of 
political stability are associated with lower exit hazard, while moderate levels of stability 
are associated with higher exit hazard. 
2.2. Moderating effect of FDI motives in the primary sector
The effect of location characteristics on subsidiary performance depends on the MNE’s 
motive for investing (Benito, 2015). Resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking, market-seeking, and 
strategic asset-seeking are the four conventionally defined FDI motives. Natural resource-seeking 
refers to accessing natural resources that are abundant in the target country. Efficiency-seeking 
involves leveraging factor cost differences in the host country, market-seeking addresses 
































































opportunities for foreign countries to exploit economies of scale or to extend product lifecycles, 
and, strategic assets-seeking looks to create long-term advantages by transferring knowledge to 
and from the host country (Meyer, 2015). 
For firms that have natural resources and market-seeking motives the cost of compliance 
with environmental standards, such as emission monitoring, impact monitoring, and technological 
upgrading, is high (Tang, 2015). Moreover, firms in countries with higher labor standards pay a 
premium for costs of hiring, labor benefits, and physical safety procedures (Friedman, 2000). Since 
both firms with natural resource-seeking motives and efficiency-seeking motives are looking for 
labor at lower prices, countries with lower labor costs would provide a more efficient place to 
operate. Finally, the cost of IFRS is higher for firms with market-seeking motives. Corruption and 
bribery are common in the natural resource sector, and a less transparent IFRS can help conceal 
these costs (Mckinney and Moore, 2008). A summary of the compliance costs on investment 
motives are shown in Table 1.
------------------------------------
Insert Table 1 about here
------------------------------------
In natural resource industries, resource-seeking is the assumed overarching investment 
motive (Jones, 2005). Cheaper or more accessible resources are the main factors impacting foreign 
country location choice. Most countries rich in natural resources are closely tied to the global 
































































economy and seek FDI to build the capacity of their extractive industries. Low stability (high 
instability) introduces added contracting costs, incurred to reduce policy uncertainty. However, 
low stability can also benefit the firm by allowing it to participate in shaping emergent policy 
regimes. Favorable awarding of contracts, concessions, and cooperation to achieve illegal goals 
are examples of the mechanisms that ease access to resources (Hall, 1999; Kolstad and Wiig, 
2013). 
Whereas in stable policy environments institutions it may not be as easy for MNEs to shape 
emergent policies as it is in unstable countries, they can still increase the operational efficiency by 
forming close relationships with powerful stakeholders, with whom they can align to achieve 
mutual goals. Overall, this leads to a less complex and hence less costly set of bargaining 
constraints. We therefore argue that investments in the primary sector with a natural resource-
seeking motive will exhibit a steeper curvilinear relationship between political stability and 
subsidiary survival:
Hypothesis 2a: The inverse U-shaped relationship between political stability and 
subsidiary exit hazard in the primary sector will be steeper when a firm has a natural 
resource-seeking motive. 
For firms with efficiency-seeking motives, cost economization is the primary objective 
(Dunning, 2000). In extraction industries, transportation and distribution costs are some of the 
most important considerations for an MNE, along with the cost of labor, and complying with 
































































product and environmental regulations (Li and Zhou, 2017; Weng and Peng, 2018). To overcome 
these costs, firms can take part in the process of establishing regulations, and even in the 
development of the infrastructure necessary to improve access to natural resources. Illegal 
payments methods, such as paying bribes to win contracts or to access raw materials with 
government subsidies, or paying lower interest rates, can all increase the financial efficiency of 
the investment (Hall, 1999; Surroca et al., 2013). 
While higher political instability provides an opportunity for firms to gain more efficient 
access to commodities, increased scrutiny by home country regulators (e.g. Securities and 
Exchange Commission in the US, Securities Exchange Surveillance Commission in Japan) and 
international watchdogs (e.g. Transp rency International, Greenpeace) can make it increasingly 
risky to take advantage of weak institutions. Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, for example, 
was specifically designed to mitigate the impact of MNEs’ sourcing of commodities including tin, 
tungsten, tantalum, and gold, from fragile states, especially Congo and its surrounding neighbors. 
The Act requires US firms (and those listed in the US) to disclose procurement of commodities 
from these countries, and their efforts to curtail funding of armed militias or human rights abusers. 
The goal of this initiative has been replicated by countries around the world including those in the 
EU and Japan. Since MNEs’ operations within these countries are subject to even greater scrutiny, 
we expect that the survival of subsidiaries in such highly unstable environments would be subject 
to increased risk. 
In summary, natural resource firms can use increasing political instability as a tool to gain 
efficient access to commodities, but relatively recent attention to those areas that are most unstable 
(the fragile states) has increased the risk of doing so. We therefore expect a stronger curvilinear 
































































relationship between political stability and subsidiary survival in the primary sector, so we argue 
that: 
Hypothesis 2b: The inverse U-shaped relationship between political stability and 
subsidiary exit hazard in the primary sector will be steeper when a firm has an efficiency-
seeking motive.
Market size and the degree of a market’s development are the top priorities of market-
seeking investments, while labor and transportation costs are secondary (Makino et al., 2002).. As 
highly traded commodities, the prices for natural resources tend to closely follow world prices. 
Nonetheless, these commodity prices are not necessarily indicative of what end consumers or 
production industries pay. In many countries and industries, prices paid for commodities by 
consumers and intermediaries in protected industries ar  subsidized (Mcmullen and Bergman, 
2018). Conversely, in other countries, commodity taxes are a key source of government revenue 
(Vetter, 2017). While political stability will create volatility in both subsidies and taxes, only a 
small proportion of firms are better able to capitalize on instability (Holburn and Zelner, 2010). 
Commodity giant BHP Billiton, for example, was charged under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA) for hosting government officials at the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics, an act judged to 
be undertaken to gain more favoritism when awarding contracts.
Although a small number of market-seeking MNEs will benefit from volatile commodity 
pricing, taxation, and subsidies, the vast majority are negatively impacted. Additionally, less stable 
































































policy environments lead to lower economic growth, which in turn limits demand for natural 
resources in general (Brouthers et al., 2008; Henisz, 2000; Keefer and Knack, 2002). Investments 
made with a market-seeking motive in the primary sector will, therefore, experience a weaker 
positive relationship, potentially even becoming negative, between low to moderate stability and 
exit hazard, and a stronger negative relationship from moderate to high political stability. We 
therefore predict:
Hypothesis 2c: The inverse U-shape relationship between political stability and subsidiary 
exit hazard in the primary sector will be flatter when a company has a market-seeking motive.
Knowledge assets and human resource stocks are typically among the most important 
strategic assets sought by MNEs. As pressures to address carbon and other undesirable emissions 
from natural resource extraction increase, firms have responded by making costly capital 
investments in clean technology. Subsidiaries located in less politically stable countries are better 
able to lobby against increasing environmental protection policies, thus avoiding these additional 
expenses (Weng and Peng, 2018). It is therefore unlikely that these subsidiaries will be harvested 
as MNEs adjust their global investments in the face of environmental protection policies. However, 
firms with strategic asset-seeking motives are unlikely to reduce their investment in enhanced 
environmental protection policies. These MNEs seek to improve their knowledge and 
competencies through accessing an educated and skilled workforce, operating in a knowledge-
sharing environment characterized by trustworthiness (Li et al., 2012). As lower political stability 
tends to lead to an environment in which governments provide fewer educational resources to a 
































































more limited number of people, the pool of educated and highly skilled employees is reduced 
(Barnard, 2008). This limited pool of knowledgeable employees rises demand, thus increasing 
their cost to the firm. This helps explain why firms from countries with greater technological 
development capabilities tend to dominate these industries, as they can extract resources more 
efficiently. Thus, if a firm in the primary sector has a strategic asset-seeking motive, particularly 
in the natural resources industry, highly unstable political environments are not conducive to 
achieving that motive (Barnard, 2008; Sarfati, 2015). Therefore, we predict that: 
Hypothesis 2d: The inverse U-shaped relationship between political stability and 
subsidiary exit hazard in the primary sector will be flatter when a company has an asset-
seeking motive.
3. Methodology
3.1. Data source 
We use data on foreign subsidiaries from Toyo Keizai’s overseas investment (TK) dataset 
to test the hypotheses. This dataset, updated annually, provides information about Japanese firms’ 
investment in foreign countries. Data are gathered through interviews with general managers, who 
provide information on each subsidiary of their parent company, including duration of the activity, 
start date, exit date, type of industry, parent firms, the purpose of investment, and so forth. The 
sample for this study consists of 6,082 observations and includes all Japanese firms that invested 
































































in the primary sector industries, in 65 foreign countries, from 1986 to 2013. After dropping 
observations with missing data, the final number of observations is 5,726 subsidiary-years. 
3.2. Dependent variable
The dependent variable for this study is subsidiary survival, which is operationalized as the 
conditional probability of exit/closure during the time of study of Japanese subsidiaries in the 
natural resources sector. This measure is a binary variable, coded as one when a subsidiary 
disappears from the panel prior to 2013 (i.e. exited). Those subsidiaries that survived to the 2013 
edition of the dataset are considered as censored data (time to exit unknown) and hence are coded 
as zero.
3.3. Independent variable
The main independent variable in this study is political stability, drawn from The PRS 
Group database. We rely on a comprehensive operationalization of political stability, consisting of 
factors related to both political risk and uncertainty (Slangen and Van Tulder, 2009). The PRS 
Group dataset provides this information based on two methodologies. The first is based on the rate 
of change of policies, the general political environment, and tariff procedures. The second 
measures political events and considers how these events impact factors such as gross domestic 
product (GDP), inflation, and exchange rate stability. The combination of these two methodologies 
results in an overall metric for countries’ risk which is highly relevant to FDI decisions. The 
content domain was selected by The PRS Group specifically to address the concerns of foreign 
direct investors.

































































The motives behind investing in host countries were obtained from the TK dataset. The 
dataset is compiled from an annual survey that is completed by senior managers, who select from 
a list of predefined investment purposes for each subsidiary of their MNE. We further categorize 
these purposes according to prior literature on the four motives (Chrysostome and Lupton, 2011). 
Table 1 depicts the encoding of these objectives into the four ‘seeking’ categories. 
3.5. Control variables
We include several control variables based on prior studies of FDI performance and 
survival. GDP growth and GDP per capita proxy the rate of changes and living standards of each 
country, respectively, while GDP per capita also proxies labor costs (Mayer et al., 2010). 
Population is included as a proxy for labor supply (Mayer et al., 2010). The openness to trade 
index, which reflects the degree of importing and exporting activities undertaken by domestic 
firms and investors, is measured by the trade ratio, drawn from the World Trade Organization 
(Delios and Beamish, 2001; Meschi et al., 2016). To control for overall FDI attractiveness of each 
country for investors, we use net FDI inflows (Brouthers et al., 2008).
3.6. Analytical approach
We use a mixed-effects parametric survival model to predict the probability of occurrence 
of a time-dependent event (subsidiary exit), based on a set of predictors (Austin, 2017) and 
dependent upon a set of moderators (purposes of investment). The event modeled was time to 
subsidiaries’ exit over a period of 26 years, from 1986 to 2013, with left censoring. The main 
assumption in the parametric survival model is the shape of the hazard baseline function. The term 
‘mixed-effects’ is refers to models that include both random and fixed effects (Crowther et al., 
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2014). To analyze multiple random effects in a specific cluster, the mixed effects parametric 
survival analysis model is used. This model is formulated as shown in equation 1, in which 𝑢𝑗 
represents the cluster j (cluster refers to a group of individuals that share the same characteristics) 
and  represents the covariates that are related to the random effect and  represents the  𝑧𝑗𝑖 𝒗𝒊𝒋
observation-level error (Austin, 2017). The Weibull distribution exhibited the best fit for our data, 
according to AIC (Akaike Information Criterion), so this distribution was used to model the 
baseline function. Equation 2 formalizes the baseline hazard function (Cleves et al., 2010). 
Equation 1: Multilevel Mixed Effects Parametric Survival Model:
  𝒉(𝒕𝒊𝒋) = 𝒉𝟎(𝒕𝒊𝒋)𝐞𝐱𝐩 (𝒙𝒊𝒋 𝜷 + 𝒛𝒋𝒊𝒖𝒋 + 𝒗𝒊𝒋)    
Equation 2: Weibull Distribution Baseline Hazard: 
                      𝒉𝟎(𝒕) = 𝒑𝒕𝒑 ― 𝟏𝐞𝐱𝐩 (𝜶)
To estimate the baseline hazard, this model was fit to the parameters (α,p,βi), that is the 
hazard ratio of the coefficients of the ith covariate, with the shape of the baseline represented by p 
as one parameter and  as the second parameter to estimate the baseline hazard (Cleves et al., 𝛼
2010). We selected a mixed-effects model because moderators that are reported in the TK dataset 
are subsidiary-level variables, while the independent variable (political stability) and control 
variables are country-level. To account for the differing levels of analysis, and the unobserved 
heterogeneity among subsidiaries, the survival model included subsidiary-level fixed effects, 
































































based on the subsidiary ID code. We estimated our model using the mestreg procedure in STATA 
15. 
4. Results
Table 2 shows the summary of sample statistics and the correlation between variables. To 
check the proportionality assumption, we employ the Schoenfeld residuals test. Since the null 
hypothesis of the Schoenfeld residuals test is that the hazard rate is constant over time, the non-
significant test (p=0.27) indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, and thus the 
proportionality assumption is supported. 
------------------------------------
Insert Table 2 about here
------------------------------------
Table 3 reports the results of running mixed effect parametric models. Model 1 includes 
the control variables. We added the linear term and the quadratic term of country risk in Model 2 
and Model 3, respectively. Models 4 to 7 include interaction terms. The Wald test chi-squared 
represents how the fit of models changes with adding different covariates. The null hypothesis of 
the Wald test is that adding a variable to the model does not add any value and removing a variable 
from the model does not impact the fit. As shown in Table 4, the chi-squared statistics of each 
model are significant, which means the Wald test is different than zero, and adding additional 
variables to the model significantly improved the overall fit. The log-likelihood function performs 
a similar function to the Wald test, i.e. it allows one to assess model fit, but is different from the 
Wald test in that log likelihood requires two models for comparison. To interpret the coefficients 
































































properly we standardized and mean-centered the country risk. Country risk coefficients show that 
one standard deviation difference in country risk is associated with a significant change in hazard 
of exit. 
------------------------------------
Insert Table 3 about here
------------------------------------
Hypothesis 1 predicted a curvilinear relationship between political stability and subsidiary 
survival. To test Hypothesis 1, Model 2 and Model 3 in Table 3 are used. Model 2 contains the 
linear term of country risk (as a measure of political stability) and control variables. As the 
coefficient represents the hazard rate, the significant (p < 0.001) and positive sign of the coefficient 
shows that one standard deviation difference in country risk is associated with a 3.6% increase in 
the standard deviation of the hazard of exit. Since Hypothesis 1 proposed that political stability 
has a curvilinear relationship with subsidiary survival, the squared term of country risk was added 
in Model 3. This significant model (P < 0.001) suggests that the effect of country risk on subsidiary 
survival is not a linear relationship. Adding the quadratic term (country risk squared) to the model 
represented the curvilinear effect of country risk on the exit rate, which changes when subsidiaries 
experience a higher level of risk. The negative coefficient of the quadratic term estimates an 
increase and then a decrease in the exit-hazard rate (inverted-U). 
As shown in Figure 1, the highest failure rate occurs when host country risk is up to one 
standard deviation higher or one standard deviation lower than the mean, and the subsidiaries 
which face the lowest degree of risk are in countries with the highest degree of political risk (more 
than one standard deviation above the mean). Hence, the lowest and the highest degree of political 
































































risk are associated with the lower exit hazard and a moderate degree of political risk is associated 
with a higher exit hazard.
Hypothesis 2a concerned the moderating effect of natural resource-seeking motive on the 
relationship between political stability and subsidiary survival. The interaction terms between 
country risk and natural resource-seeking were added to Model 5 to test Hypothesis 3a. The p-
values of country risk x natural resource-seeking and squared country risk x natural resource-
seeking (p = 0.32 and p = 0.253, respectively) do not provide evidence that natural resource-
seeking has a moderating effect on the relationship between political stability and subsidiary 
survival. Therefore, Hypothesis 3a is not supported. 
Hypothesis 2b concerned the moderating effect of efficiency-seeking motive on the 
relationship between political stability and subsidiary survival. The coefficients for the interaction 
terms country risk x efficiency-seeking and country risk2 x efficiency-seeking in Model 6 are 
marginally significant (p = 0.051 and p = 0.056, respectively). This offers marginal support for 
Hypothesis 2b, that efficiency-seeking motives improve subsidiary survival in politically unstable 
countries. This marginally supports the argument that efficiency-seeking motives reduce a 
subsidiary’s hazard of exit when political instability increases, although the effect is relatively 
small in this case. 
Hypothesis 2c concerned the moderating effect of market-seeking motives on the 
relationship between political stability and subsidiary survival. Model 7 includes the interaction 
terms between country risk and political stability. The p-values of country risk x market-seeking 
and country risk2 x market-seeking are marginally significant (p = 0.072 and p = 0.108, 
respectively). This significant interaction supports Hypothesis 2c which predicts that having 
































































market-seeking motives reduces subsidiary survival when the level of political instability 
increases. As the coefficient of country risk increases by about 10%, this means that having this 
investment motive increases the chance of exit, and an additional increase in the country risk leads 
to a 0.1% increase in the exit hazard compared to Model 3, where no interaction term was added. 
Hypothesis 2d concerned the potential moderating effect of strategic asset-seeking motive 
on the relationship between political stability and subsidiary survival. To test this hypothesis, the 
interaction terms country risk x strategic asset-seeking and country risk2 x strategic asset-seeking 
were added in Model 8. The p-value of these interactions is not significant (p = 0.728, p = 0.737); 
therefore, Hypothesis 3d is not supported. 
------------------------------------
Insert Figure 1 about here
------------------------------------
5. Discussion
Our paper contributes to the special issue call by finding empirical evidence that MNEs in 
the primary sector benefit by exploiting low policy compliance costs in politically unstable 
countries, which is a common criticism of globalization (Bhagwati, 2002, 2004; Guillén, 2001). 
We provide evidence that the benefits of engaging in this sort of institutional arbitrage can 
contribute to a lower subsidiary exit hazard in politically unstable countries. However, the effect 
is small compared to the positive relationship between political instability and exit hazard. While 
few would agree that exploitation of unstable countries by MNEs is much ado about nothing, and 
































































one can readily find unsettling examples, lack of transparency and difficulty in detecting unethical 
behavior creates challenges for policymakers interested in eliminating this behavior. For instance, 
in the previously mentioned case of the Freeport McMoRan’s mine in Indonesia, the close links 
with the Suharto regime and the military have protected the company from accusations of 
environmental damage, oppression of native West Papuan people, and even allegedly collaboration 
with Indonesian military intelligence officers to monitor environmentalists’ e-mails and telephone 
conversations. To apply the logic of one of the original institutional economists, there is a 
significant cost to policing foreign activities of firms (Coase, 1937). This is perhaps not surprising, 
as it takes significant time for lobbying efforts to impact MNEs, as in the oft-cited case of Nike, 
and that natural resource companies are neither readily recognized nor boycotted by consumers. 
We chose to study extractive industries because there are significant opportunities for firms 
to exploit institutional differences in this sector (Casarin et al., 2020), including locating in 
pollution havens, and likewise that the large capital investments would benefit greatly from cost 
reduction through using older technologies, ‘dirtier’ extraction techniques and reduced investment 
in workplace safety. In the manufacturing and service sectors, instability is found to curtail 
investments (Barry, 2016; Delios and Henisz, 2003). We have argued that the relationship between 
political stability and subsidiary survival is curvilinear in the extractive industries because 
resources are what initially bring a location under consideration, while the host country 
stakeholders are more or less willing to negotiate on rents, tax, labor conditions, and so forth 
(Schultz, 2009). Some analysts have estimated that the oil and gas sector, in particular, spends as 
much as  USD 200  million, lobbying to influence policy aimed at mitigating climate change 
(Mccarthy, 2019).
































































We contribute also to the subsidiary survival literature by providing evidence on how 
subsidiaries in the primary sector react to different levels of political stability in host countries. By 
detecting a curvilinear relationship between host country political stability and subsidiary survival 
in the primary sector, partially dependent upon the motives of the investing MNE (Brouthers et 
al., 2008), we help resolve a tension in the literature, namely that countries with highly stable 
political systems attract FDI (Bailey, 2018), while there are opportunities to exploit low stability 
(Barnard and Luiz, 2018; Petrou and Thanos, 2014). The answer, in the context of Japanese MNEs, 
during their most active period of international expansion, is that both perspectives are correct but 
that the potentially undesirable behavior is rare. This can be partially attributed to the higher 
scrutiny that home country regulators, such as the Securities Exchange Surveillance Commission 
in Japan, as well as international NGOs, are applying to reduce behaviors that take advantage of 
weak institutions. However, this may not be the case with MNEs from countries such as Brazil, 
China and India, where navigating informal governance practices is common. MNEs from these 
countries may show both greater ability and willingness to engage in non-market strategies, 
including those with dubious ethical implications, in less stable political environments (Barassi 
and Zhou, 2012). 
6. Limitations, Future Research and Conclusions
Since the dataset is constrained to Japanese firms, the generalizability is limited beyond 
this sample. Governance of Japanese MNEs may be less risk-averse due to interlocking 
directorates (Buckley and Strange, 2011). According to the logic of our study, this suggests that 
many Japanese MNEs would be less averse to investing in countries with high political instability. 
Future studies may attempt to determine the extent to which country of origin impacts the 
































































relationships we found between political instability and subsidiary survival, depending on 
investment motives. Also, the various types of policy changes related to environmental 
stewardship, financial reporting, and other relevant policies, and their impact on the decision to 
invest, is another research avenue for future study. In particular, the impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic on policy changes and foreign investment is an important area for future research. 
Furthermore, the examination of specific policies, rather than broad indices like political stability, 
can provide a more nuanced understanding of what types of policies produce the most vigorous 
response from MNE investors1. 
Finally, we chose natural resource investments as the context for our study because the 
potential costs of compliance with increasingly stringent environmental requirements, dealing with 
corruption without resorting to bribery, and workplace health, safety, and benefits are large. 
However, this is also the case for a large variety of manufacturing subsidiaries, especially those in 
‘dirty industries’ (Copeland and Taylor, 1994) and so replication and extension in other industries 
is warranted.
This study sought to investigate the extent to which natural resource subsidiary survival is 
impacted by location in a politically unstable country where, while transaction costs are typically 
higher, opportunities for exploiting less stringent legal requirements might entice MNEs to invest. 
We found that political risk has a curvilinear relationship with subsidiary survival, such that both 
high and low stability are associated with higher survival (lower exit hazard), while moderate 
levels of risk reduce subsidiary survival. This nonlinear relationship is stronger with the efficiency-
seeking motive, and weaker with the market-seeking motive, as expected. 
1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this important line of inquiry.
































































The practical implication of our finding is that subsidiary survival is improved in host 
countries with high political risk, but the effect is very small in comparison with the effect of 
investment in countries with the highest political stability. Hence, while there may be benefits to 
the strategy of exploiting weak institutional environments, the benefits from doing so are 
diminishingly small, at least for Japanese MNEs. This effect should not be ignored, but controlling 
for the behavior through policy intervention will be difficult, and most certainly costly. The 
argument against globalization, that being that it creates a race to the institutional bottom, is 
probably exaggerated given the evidence shown in this study. Nonetheless, future research should 
keep contributing to the debate through empirical evidence, as the strength and influence of anti-
globalization sentiment continue to mount, while the quantity of outward FDI is accelerating from 
countries outside the triad region of Japan, North America, and Western Europe.
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Figure1. Kaplan-Meier Failure Estimations
*risk -2, -1, 2, 1 represent the standard deviation of the political risk































































Categories of investment purpose
*Source: Toyo Keizai Overseas Investment (TK) dataset, 2014.
Seeking Category Investment Purpose* Compliance 
Area




Resources and materials  Natural Resource 
Seeking – very high











Emissions Monitoring    
Impact Monitoring  
Clean up costs
Asset Seeking – mixed 
effect
Reverse import to Japan  Natural resource 
seeking - High
Follow customers, suppliers, 
and related firms
 Efficiency Seeking 
(Labor) – Very High
Export to third countries Market seeking Low
Efficiency seeking








 Hiring costs  
Asset Seeking Low
Collection of information, 
knowledge seeking, royalty
 Natural Resource 
Seeking – Low
















































































Correlations, means, standard deviations, and ranges of observations
Variables Mean SD Min. Max. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1.Country Risk 75.935 8.24 30 93          
2.Market seeking 0.15 0.35 0 1 -0.14         
3.Natural resource 
seeing
0.48 0.5 0 1 -0.07 0.04        
4.Strategic asset 
seeking
0.16 0.37 0 1 0.01 0.13 0.25       
5.Efficiency 
seeking
0.31 0.46 0 1 -0.23 0.43 0.31 0.19      
6.FDI inflows 3.93 7.43 -33.85 103.33 0.16 -0.05 -0.13 -0.03 -0.12     
7.Trade Ratio 69.14 39.94 0.17 442.62 0.09 -0.04 -0.16 -0.03 -0.06 0.47    
8.Population 214.19 914.5 2.25 7714.7 0.12 -0.04 -0.14 -0.06 -0.07 0.32 0.77   
9.GDP per Capita 21949.62 19658.94 102.65 103059.2 0.56 -0.19 -0.13 -0.05 -0.26 0.2 0.02 0.11  
10.GDP growth 63.77 2004.05 -13.13 70396.82 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.02
































































Mixed effect parametric (Weibull) survival model results
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
FDI inflow 0.025* 0.023** 0.021** 0.018* 0.02* 0.021** 0.02
(0.009) (0.008) (-0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 0.009 0.008
Trade ratio -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 0.002 0.002
Population 0.001* 0.001 Ɨ 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001 0.001*
(0.001) (-0.001) (-0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 0.001 0.001
GDP per capita 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 0.00 0.00
GDP growth -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 0.001 0.001
Country risk  0.045** 0.527** 0.589** 0.432** 0.612** 0.525**
 (0.012) (0.112) (0.152) (0.116) 0.123 0.116
Country risk2   -0.004** -0.005** -0.003** -0.005** -0.004**
  (-0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 0.001 0.001
Resource seeking 5.175
(7.611)
Resource seeking × Country Risk    -0.215    
   (0.216)    
Resource seeking × Country Risk2    0.002    
   (0.002)    
Efficiency seeking -25.033
(12.43)
Efficiency seeking × Country Risk     0.672*   
    (0.345)   
Efficiency seeking × Country Risk2     -0.005*   
    (0.003)   
Market  seeking 20.649
(10.69)
Market seeking × Country Risk      -0.555 Ɨ  
     (0.309)  
Market seeking × Country Risk2      0.004  
     (0.003)  
Strategic asset seeking -6.391
(15.432)
Strategic asset seeking × Country 
Risk 
      0.149
      (0.428)
Strategic asset seeking × Country 
Risk2 
      -0.001
      (0.003)
Constant -30.196** -31.447** -45.933** -47.725** -41.136** -49.239 -45.772
(4.001) (3.223) (5.152) (6.405) (5.086) (5.622) (5.26)
Number of observations 5,610 5,603 5,603 5,603 5,603 5,603 5,603
Log likelihood (LL) -4678.183 -4661.174 -4652.204 -4642.531 -4648.891 -4648.486 -4649.124
Wald chi2 16.12 31.07 39.84 62.75 42.86 46.34 47.71
Prob > chi2      0.0065 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00































































Significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, Ɨ p <0.10.  Standard deviation of 
coefficients is in parentheses.
NOTE: Country Risk is an index, and so it is mean centered and standardized prior to entry into 
the regression to improve interpretability of the coefficients. Other variables are not 
standardized, as the coefficients can be interpreted in terms of the original units.
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